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We propose a model of religious organizations which relies on the ability of such 
organizations to affect individual beliefs about the causality between actions in the 
social context and personal utility shocks. We show how religious organizations 
arise endogenously and characterize their features. Specifically, we find that 
members of the religious organization share similar beliefs and are more likely to 
cooperate with one another in social interactions. We identify a "spiritual" as well 
as a "material" payoff for members of the religious organization.  Our results 
explain and shed light on empirical phenomena such as the effects of 
secularization and economic development on religious beliefs and participation, the 
relation between the size of the religion and the intensity of its members’ beliefs, 
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The role of religion in society has recently been the subject of renewed empirical and exper-
imental interest. In particular, the literature focuses on how religious beliefs and religious
practice a⁄ect various parameters, ranging from micro data such as individuals￿well-being
and individual behaviour (Gruber 2003, Sosis and Ru› e 2003), to macro parameters such as
growth (Barro and McCleary 2003, Guiso, Sapeinza and Zingales 2003) and the provision of
state social insurance (Stasavage and Scheve 2006).
Religious beliefs and religious practice are clearly two important and possibly inseparable
features of religious organizations. The study of religious beliefs however has largely been
neglected in the economic literature on religion.2 In this paper we propose a theory of religious
organizations that focuses on the ability of such organizations to a⁄ect individuals￿beliefs. In
our theory, religious beliefs and religious practice are determined together; this allows us to
derive predictions on the link between them, as well as to shed light on some of the recent
￿ndings in the literature.
We consider a society in which individuals are randomly paired to play a one-shot symmetric
Prisoner￿ s Dilemma (PD) game. Following the strategic interaction, individuals experience
shocks to their well-being. In our model, religious beliefs will be de￿ned by a statistical relation
(possibly guided by some supernatural entity) between an individual￿ s behaviour in the social
context and his likelihood to experience these negative or positive utility shocks. Examples of
such systems of religious beliefs are abundant in the Anthropological literature.3 Concepts of
rewards and punishments for one￿ s deeds, in an individual or in a social context, in this life or
the afterlife, exist in the Abrahamic religions as well as in the Eastern ones, such as Buddhism
(Karma and Vikapa) and Hinduism (where Papa refers to social actions that create negative
karma), among others.4
Religious organizations play an active role in shaping beliefs; many invest time and e⁄ort in
advocating certain kinds of messages while censoring others.5 Our main assumption is that an
2Some exceptions are Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Bisin and Verdier (2001), which consider beliefs (but
do not explicitly model religious organizations).
3Evans-Pritchard (1956) writes on the Nuer in Sudan: "...and in any argument about conduct the issue is
always whether a person has conformed to the accepted norms of social life....the Nuer are of one voice in saying
that sooner or later good will follow right conduct and ill will follow wrong conduct.".
4Note that religious belief systems are sometimes more complex, e.g., conditioning consequences also on the
behavior of others. We discuss more complex belief systems in Section 5.
5One example of censorship is the Index Librorum Prohibitorum ("List of Prohibited Books") (from 1529 to
1966) which listed publications prohibited by the Roman Catholic Church.
2individual￿ s a¢ liation with a religious organization endows him with religious beliefs. We also
assume that di⁄erent individuals have di⁄erent propensities to be a⁄ected by such religious
preaching.6 Those who are not a¢ liated with a religious organization, i.e., seculars, see no
statistical relation between their actions in the PD game and the shocks to their utility.
Finally, we assume that individuals who belong to the religious organization take part in
some observable activity that we interpret as rituals. Religious participation thus has a duel
role in our theory; it is a public activity that allows individuals to distinguish between di⁄erent
a¢ liations and it a⁄ects the beliefs of individuals about the causality of utility shocks.
We formalize an equilibrium notion of stable religious organizations in which no agent wishes
to change her a¢ liation and behaviour given other individuals￿a¢ liation choices and expected
behaviour. Our ￿rst set of results establishes that stable religious organizations arise en-
dogenously in equilibrium and characterizes their properties: Any organized religion always
includes, and sometimes exclusively includes, individuals who believe that they are more likely
to receive a negative shock when they defect rather than when they cooperate. In addition,
religious individuals are more cooperative towards fellow religious members than they are to-
wards seculars. Finally, we ￿nd that whenever some agents in society are secular, religious
participation (rituals) must be costly.7
In our model, the bene￿t from being religious (versus secular) is composed of a "material"
and a "spiritual" component. The spiritual component arises as religious individuals behave
more cooperatively, which, given their beliefs, will bring about good fortune in the future.
Only religious individuals can be motivated by the spiritual payo⁄as only they can potentially
believe that cooperation yields rewards. The material bene￿t of becoming religious, which can
motivate all individuals, arises as relative to seculars, religious individuals enjoy a higher level
of cooperation in social interactions.
The material bene￿t of religion identi￿ed in our model is supported by empirical studies
showing a link between religious participation, social ties and mutual assistance.8 It is also
an important distinction between our approach and previous ones. The economic literature
6The heterogeneity of individual propensities to be a⁄ected by religious preaching is motivated by the Evolu-
tionary Biology literature. Boyer (2001) summarizes how di⁄erent evolutionary strategies might create di⁄erent
types of "religious centres" in the human mind.
7Barro and McCleary (2003) ￿nd that economic growth responds positively to religious beliefs but negatively
to religious participation. Our model implies a positive relation between religious beliefs and cooperative
behaviour, which may enhance economic growth. Also, as we ￿nd that rituals are costly, religious participation
could be an impediment to growth.
8See for example Wilson (2002) and Bradley (1995). Ellison and George (1994) ￿nd a positive relationship
between religious participation and social ties in a survey of 2,956 households in the southeastern United States.
3on religion has mainly focused on spiritual motivations for becoming religious. For example
Iannaccone (1992), Stark (1996) and Berman (2000), among others, are all based on the premise
that individuals have a demand for spiritual goods, and that religious organizations are the
providers of such goods. We ￿nd that the material bene￿t provided by the religion, through
enhanced internal cooperation, is in some cases su¢ cient to outweigh the cost of religious
participation - which implies that religion can be bene￿cial to everyone in society.
Our second set of results establishes the relation between the intensity of rituals, the beliefs
and behaviour of religious individuals, and the size of the religion. In particular, we ￿nd that
religious groups that are more demanding in their rituals are smaller, more cohesive (that is,
their members behave more cooperatively towards one another), and are composed of indi-
viduals whose beliefs are more "extreme" about the relation between unsocial behaviour and
punishment. Moreover, when several religious organizations arise in equilibrium, the smaller
and more conservative religions are less cooperative towards the larger and less conservative
ones, thus creating a "hierarchy" of religions (or denominations within religions). These pre-
dictions ￿nds support in the empirical studies of Iannaccone (1992, 1994, 1998), and in several
experimental studies (see Orbell et al 1992 and Sosis and Ru› e 2003).
We next analyze the e⁄ects of modernization on religious participation and beliefs. The
Weberian view posits that with scienti￿c progress the role of religious organizations in society
will diminish over time. Durkeim has suggested that their role will diminish with economic
development, as state and economic institutions will provide material bene￿ts in their stead.
Our framework allows us to analyze these hypotheses. We ￿nd that the e⁄ects of modernization
on religion are not neccesarily monotone. While for small cohesive religions, scienti￿c progress
decreases participation and increases the intensity of the remaining participants￿beliefs and
rituals, it does not necessarily decrease participation in large religions which provide substantial
material bene￿ts. On the other hand, economic development indeed lowers participation and
intensity of beliefs for most types of religious organizations.9
Finally, we examine the dynamic evolution of religious organizations in response to corre-
lated utility shocks such as economic booms, recessions or natural disasters. In such occasions
individuals can update their beliefs about the causality of welfare shocks. We ￿nd that corre-
lated positive utility shocks cause beliefs to polarize, inducing deconversions and as a result a
reduction in the size of the religion. In contrast, negative shocks may yield both conversions
and deconversions, with an ambiguous e⁄ect on the size of religious organizations. While sev-
9Our results can help interpret Huber (2005) who shows that in more developed countries, church goers
become more conservative, "non believers" stop attending church, and "network" e⁄ects are less important.
4eral empirical studies have examined how religiosity may allow individuals to cope with bad
news, to our knowledge few have investigated how bad or good outcomes a⁄ect religiosity (see
Chen (2008)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the
model. In Section 3 we present our main results about religious organizations in equilibrium,
including a discussion of welfare properties and comparative statics. In the ￿rst extension of
our model, in Section 4, we consider the di⁄erent ways in which competition between religious
groups manifests itself and show that religious con￿ icts may arise as a tool to increase group
membership. In Section 5 we consider a dynamic extension; we analyse the ability of religious
organizations to survive in the long run, shedding light on aspects such as the "afterlife" and
"forgiveness", as well as religious segregation. An appendix contains all proofs.
2 The model
We consider a society in which individuals are paired to play a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma (PD)
game. Some individuals are secular and some are religious. Being religious is related to two
(inseparable) features: participation in a costly and observable activity, and having certain
beliefs about the statistical relation between actions in the PD game and private utility shocks.
Given the observable religious activity, individuals can condition their behaviour in the PD
game on their opponent￿ s a¢ liation. Our notion of equilibrium will involve optimal behaviour
in the PD game and a stability condition on individuals￿a¢ liation choices. We now explain
the model in more detail.




where b > d > a > c: We assume strategic complements, i.e., that d ￿ b > c ￿ a: This
assumption is the standard one in the literature on cooperation in such games.
Social rituals. Being religious is associated with some observable action, with a cost r
(r can be either positive or negative). An individual that has paid the cost r is ￿religious￿ ,
otherwise he is ￿secular￿ . We interpret these observable actions as religious rituals. We
consider rituals, such as attendance in religious sermons, which not only allow group members
to identify and familiarize themselves with one another but may also have an e⁄ect on the
5beliefs of individuals, as we describe later on.10
Utility shocks. We assume that following the strategic interaction, each individual believes
he will receive, in addition to the payo⁄s of the PD game, either a negative utility shock, ￿";
or a positive utility shock, ": Apart from participation in rituals, we di⁄erentiate between
seculars and religious individuals also according to their beliefs about the relationship between
the shocks and their actions in the PD game, as we now explain.
Beliefs. We assume that seculars believe that there is no relation between actions taken in
the PD game and utility shocks. They view the social interaction as the "material" PD game
and hence their best response is to defect. Religious individuals on the other hand believe that
there is some pattern determining the shocks, and that this pattern depends on their actions
in the PD game. One interpretation for such beliefs is that the shocks are the intentional
actions of some supernatural entity which rewards or punishes individuals according to their
behaviour.
Speci￿cally, each individual i in the population is endowed with a type re￿ ecting his propen-
sity to be a⁄ected by religious participation. In particular, individual i0s type, (qi
c;qi
d); rep-
resents his beliefs when he is religious. That is, a religious individual believes that when he
cooperates, he receives the negative shock with probability qi
c 2 [0;1] and that when he defects,
he receives the negative shock with probability qi
d 2 [0;1]. Note that this formulation allows
for individuals not to be a⁄ected by religious participation; a religious individual with qi
c = qi
d
does not believe that his actions in the social game have any statistical e⁄ect on the type of
shock he will experience.
We assume risk neutrality and thus the expected utility of a religious individual who co-
operates is x + "(1 ￿ 2qi
c); for x 2 fc;dg (depending on his rival￿ s action), and similarly, the
expected utility of a religious individual who defects is x + "(1 ￿ 2qi
d); for x 2 fa;bg:
It will be su¢ cient, as will become apparent later on, to characterize the types in the
population by the parameter qi = qi
c ￿qi
d; where the higher is qi; the less a religious individual
fears that defection will lead to punishment. Note that the dominant action of a religious
individual with qi ￿ ￿ q = d￿b
2" is to defect in the PD game, whereas the dominant action of a
religious individual with qi ￿ q = c￿a
2" < ￿ q; is to cooperate, with both ￿ q and q strictly negative.
The best response of those with qi 2 (q; ￿ q); henceforth ￿intermediates", is to cooperate if their
opponent does, and defect otherwise.
As types with qi > 0 will play no role in the results, we focus on types in [￿1;0]: Let these
10In an alternative model, agents might also choose whom to interact with, conditional on whether he had
paid the cost or not. We discuss this possibility in Section 5.
6types be distributed on [￿1;0] according to some continuous distribution function F(:); with
density f satisfying 0 < f(:) < 1 everywhere. We assume that F(:) is common knowledge but
that individuals do not observe the belief qi of their religious opponent i.11 Finally, we assume
that shocks are important enough so that both ￿ q and q are in the support of the population,
i.e., that q = c￿a
2" > ￿1:
Equilibrium notion. We focus on the case in which there is only one organized religion in
society (for other cases see Section 4). For any (r;F); we look at a con￿guration of a¢ liation
and PD strategy choices, and check whether it is stable.
Our equilibrium de￿nition consists therefore of two main conditions. First, individuals must
optimally choose how to play in the social interaction. As paying r is observable, the strategy
of an individual in the PD game may depend on whether his (randomly matched) opponent is
religious or not.
Second, individuals￿a¢ liations are optimal, that is, the religious must prefer to be reli-
gious, while seculars must prefer to be secular, given others￿behaviour and a¢ liations. This
equilibrium requirement is more subtle, as we need to determine how individuals evaluate
counterfactual a¢ liation choices. We make two assumptions. We assume that an individual
evaluates both a¢ liations given his current beliefs (i.e., qi 2 [￿1;0] for the religious, and the
belief that there is no relation between shocks and actions for seculars). This assumption
accords with the "partial empathy" approach, i.e., when parents use their own preferences to
evaluate their children￿ s welfare (see Tabellini (2007), Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Benabou
and Tirole (2006)). We also assume that individuals anticipate that their beliefs will change
once they switch their a¢ liation. Relaxing this assumption will not change the qualitative
nature of our results.
Formally, equilibria in the model satisfy the following conditions:
1. (Optimal behaviour in the social interaction): Given the a¢ liation choices, and individual
beliefs, the strategies in the PD game are best responses.
2. (Optimal a¢ liation): Given the strategies in the PD game, and their current beliefs, a
religious individual i prefers to be religious than to be secular (and defect) and a secular
individual i prefers to be secular than to be religious (and behave according to qi).
11We maintain the assumption that there is no restriction imposed on the personal beliefs of agents given
their knowledge of the distribution of beliefs in society at large. This is motivated either by an assumption






73. (Maximizing religious participation): There is no secular individual, such that if he
becomes religious, strictly prefers to stay religious.
The third requirement is motivated by a surplus maximizing incentive of religious organiza-
tions. The assumption is that if there exists an individual that may be converted, the religious
organization is able to do so. This re￿nement does not change the qualitative structure of
religious organizations but rather selects the "largest" possible group for any r.
Notation and preliminaries: Finally, we introduce some notation. First, let ￿ be the
share of the religious in society (with 1 ￿ ￿ being the share of seculars). Let ￿RR be the
probability that a randomly chosen religious individual cooperates when he meets another
religious opponent. Similarly, let ￿RS denote the probability that a randomly chosen religious
individual cooperates when he meets a secular opponent. These probabilities (as well as ￿) are
determined in equilibrium given the share and the strategies of the types who join the religion.
Note that given ￿RR; intermediate religious types in [q;q￿] for some q￿ ￿ ￿ q will cooperate
against religious opponents and types above q￿ will defect against them (where a higher ￿RR
will induce a higher q￿). As all intermediates defect against seculars, we have that ￿RR ￿ ￿RS;
where a strict inequality would hold in equilibrium if some religious intermediates cooperate
only against fellow religious opponents.
3 Religion: beliefs, rituals and social behaviour
In this section we provide our main results about religious organizations. First, Proposition 1
below establishes the existence of religion in equilibrium and summarizes its main features:
Proposition 1 For su¢ ciently low values of r, there exists an equilibrium with a religious
organization. Any equilibrium with a religion is characterized by: (i) a cuto⁄ q0 ￿ ￿ q such that
all agents with types qi ￿ q0 are religious; (ii) ￿RR ￿ ￿RS > 0; (iii) r > 0 whenever some
agents are secular.
Proposition 1 provides the basis for our interpretation of equilibrium as a religious organiza-
tion: It connects the three observed aspect of religious groups, namely, beliefs, social behaviour
and rituals. In equilibrium, those who engage in costly activities typically believe that unsocial
behaviour leads to ￿punishment￿ . The behaviour of these individuals is more cooperative and
more so among themselves. Finally, the Proposition provides a rationale as to why rituals are
often costly activities.
8We now analyze religious organizations in more detail; we ￿rst provide equilibrium analysis
and a taxonomy of religious organizations. Our analysis reveals how religions provide material
bene￿ts to their members; we discuss such bene￿ts and their normative properties. We derive
a monotonicity result on the link between intensity of rituals, the size of religions and their
level of cooperation. Finally, we perform comparative statics analysis to consider the e⁄ects of
scienti￿c progress and economic development on religious participation.
3.1 Equilibrium analysis
To understand how the equilibria with religious organizations are determined, consider the
bene￿t for an individual with a¢ liation J 2 fR;Sg of being religious vs. being secular, VJ(qi):
Such relative bene￿t depends on her current a¢ liation, or more precisely, on her current
beliefs. It is computed as the di⁄erence in the expected utility of being in each a¢ liation,
while abstracting from the cost r:
Consider ￿rst a religious individual who evaluates whether to stay religious or to become
secular, given the equilibrium parameters ￿;￿RR;￿RS: Suppose that this individual has an
intermediate q; and that her best response is to cooperate against fellow religious opponents.
We then have:
VR(qi) = (1)
￿(￿RRd + (1 ￿ ￿RR)c) + (1 ￿ ￿)a + "￿(1 ￿ 2qi
c) + "(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 2qi
d)
￿￿(￿RSb + (1 ￿ ￿RS)a) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a ￿ "(1 ￿ 2qi
d)
As qi = qi
c ￿ qi
d; VR(qi) can be written as:
VR(qi) = ￿(￿RRd + (1 ￿ ￿RR)c ￿ ￿RSb ￿ (1 ￿ ￿RS)a) ￿ 2"￿qi
= M(qi) + S(qi)
where
M(qi) = ￿(￿RRd + (1 ￿ ￿RR)c ￿ ￿RSb ￿ (1 ￿ ￿RS)a)
S(qi) = ￿2"￿qi
For the religious, there are two reasons for preferring to stay religious. A "material" mo-
tivation, M(qi); arises due to a material gain -as a religious individual may obtain a higher
level of cooperation from society if ￿RR > ￿RS, and a material loss -as a religious individual
takes suboptimal actions -cooperates- against fellow religious ones. If she were to be secular
9she would lose the material gain but avoid the material loss from cooperation. The material
payo⁄ depends on qi only through its e⁄ect on behaviour.
A "spiritual" motivation, S(qi); arises when religious individuals anticipate that they will
cooperate more often when religious, both because of the beliefs instilled by the religion, but
also because others might cooperate against them more often. If they become secular on the
other hand, they will defect - a scenario they may wish to avoid given their current beliefs.
The spiritual payo⁄ depends directly on qi and arises because religious participation has an
e⁄ect on beliefs in our model.
The above decomposition of the religious type￿ s bene￿t into a material and spiritual payo⁄
holds more generally for all types qi 2 [￿1;0]: Moreover if we compute the analogous relative
bene￿t of being religious for secular individuals, it would solely consist of the material payo⁄.
We show in the appendix that all equilibria (with seculars) can be characterized by solving
for q0 at which the bene￿t of being religious equates the cost of joining the religion,
VR(q0) = r:
For example, if the marginal type who joins the religion is, as above, an intermediate type
who cooperates against fellow religious agents, the ￿xed point equation in q0; given (1), becomes
(as ￿ = F(q0); ￿￿RS = F(q) and ￿RR = 1):
(F(q0) ￿ F(q))(d ￿ a) + F(q)(d ￿ b) ￿ 2"q0F(q0) = r
We show in the appendix that, for any F; and as long as r is not too large, solutions exist
to sustain di⁄erent types of religious organizations, which we describe next.
3.2 Taxonomy of religious organizations
Religious organizations are di⁄erentiated according to the level of internal as well as external
cooperation:
Proposition 2 Any equilibrium with a religious organization is characterized by one of the
following con￿gurations, and each such con￿guration exists for some values of r :
(i) Religions with full cooperation: All (and only) individuals with qi ￿ q0 for some
q0 ￿ q are religious, and they cooperate with all opponents.
(ii) Religions with selective cooperation: All (and only) individuals with qi ￿ q0 for
some q < q0 ￿ ￿ q are religious; religious individuals in [q;q0] defect against seculars and coop-
erate against religious opponents.
10(iii) Religions with free riders: All individuals with qi ￿ q0 for some q < q0 < ￿ q; and in
addition some with qi > q0; are religious. Religious individuals in [q;q0] defect against seculars
and cooperate against religious opponents, whereas religious in [q0;0] defect against all.
(iv) Religious societies: All individuals in society are religious; those below q0 for some
q ￿ q0 ￿ ￿ q; cooperate and those above q0 defect against all.
In the full cooperation religion, only individuals below q are religious. These agents cooperate
indiscriminately, so that ￿RR = ￿RS = 1. There is no material bene￿t from being religious,
only a material loss. Still, agents are religious because of the spiritual payo⁄.
In the selective cooperation religions, religions are larger and its members are less cooperative
towards seculars; intermediates cooperate only against their fellow religious opponents so that
1 = ￿RR > ￿RS: Such selective behaviour can be found in the scriptures and preaching of
several religions and its role seems to be to increase kinship feelings to the larger community.12
In these equilibria both a spiritual and a material bene￿t exist:
In some equilibria "free riders" join the religion and defect against all, so that ￿RR < 1:
These free riders become religious to take advantage of the material bene￿t. They can be
thought of as non-believers who nonetheless attend church and participate in religious life.
Huber (2005) ￿nds empirical evidence that some church goers are non-believers, mainly in
less-developed countries that exhibit strong network e⁄ects.
Finally, the whole society can be religious. The material bene￿t is based on the out of
equilibrium beliefs that intermediate types defect against seculars. This equilibrium - and
only this one - can be sustained for negative values of r, i.e., religious rituals can be directly
bene￿cial to one￿ s utility. In all other con￿gurations r has to be strictly positive; otherwise,
all types, who when religious defect against fellow members, would be in the religion (as they
have a non-negative material bene￿t from doing so).
3.3 The secular bene￿ts of religion: a normative result
Our model has identi￿ed the secular bene￿ts of religion; religious individuals enjoy a higher
level of cooperation, and moreover, compared with a fully secular society, religion enhances
cooperation overall. Such bene￿ts are an important distinction between our paper and previous
ones, who emphasized the role of religion as providing spiritual religious goods. Moreover, there
are many documented examples of how religions enhance social cohesion and cooperation,
12For example, in Judaism, "you shall not hate your brother in your heart" (Leviticus 19:17) and "Do not
act vengefully or bear a grudge against members of your nation" (Leviticus 19:19) are based on a concept of
"national mutuality" and speci￿cally apply to Jews only.
11bene￿ting group members and sometimes non-members through spillovers.13 To give one such
contemporary example, consider the Korean Christian Church in Houston, Texas. Kwon,
Ebaugh and Hagan (1997) provide the following account by one of the members:
"When I came to Houston, I did not know a single person here...I went to a Korean
church...Soon, they found me a position in a restaurant which was operated be a
church member. He allowed me to eat as much as I wanted...that￿ s how I saved
money to start my "road sales" business. I continued to attend the church. Later,
when I opened my shop, many church members came to my shop as customers."
When we consider whether religion is potentially welfare-improving in society, such bene￿ts
are obviously on the positive side. On the other hand, religion might decrease individuals￿
welfare; members of religious organizations might hold wrong beliefs that will lead them to
take suboptimal actions. In addition, religious participation involves costly rituals that might
be unproductive or wasteful.14 Thus there may be a trade-o⁄ between social cohesion on one
side and "erroneous beliefs" and costly practice on the other.
Abstracting from the spiritual payo⁄provided by the religion to its members (which depends
on the true distribution governing the shocks), we ￿nd that for some parameters, the material
bene￿ts of religion can be large enough so that the existence of religion is Pareto-improving:
Proposition 3 For some parameters, an equilibrium with religion provides all individuals
in society a higher material utility than when everyone is secular.
The material bene￿t gained by enhanced internal cooperation within the religion, is some-
times large enough to outweigh the cost of rituals as well as the suboptimal actions taken by
some religious individuals against seculars (namely, that they cooperate). Moreover, the secu-
lars in society bene￿t from the spillovers in social cohesion that arise with such organizations.
Thus, religion can be welfare-improving to all.
3.4 Intensity of rituals and the size of religion: a monotonicity result
Religious organizations di⁄er in the level of cooperation they induce, their size, and their
intensity of rituals. When the level of the shock is large enough, we ￿nd a monotone relationship
13Wilson (2002) discusses several cases of historical and contemporary religions which provide "secular utility"
to its members.
14The Anthropology literature provides many examples of intense ritualistic societies. One extreme example
discussed in Boyer (2001) are some religions in Melanesia where people perform an extraordinary number of
rituals to protect themselves from witchcraft.
12among these parameters. Namely, a higher intensity of rituals is associated with a smaller
religion and a larger degree of internal and external cooperation:
Proposition 4 For su¢ ciently high values of "; there exist values ￿ r > r1 > r2 > r > 0
such that:
(i) For any r 2 [0; ￿ r] there exists a unique equilibrium with religion.
(ii) For any r 2 [r1; ￿ r] the religion has full cooperation, for any r 2 [r2;r1] the religion has
selective cooperation, for any r 2 [r;r2] the religion has free riders and for any r ￿ r2, society
is fully religious.
(iii) For all r ￿￿ r; religious membership (￿) decreases in the intensity of rituals (r), whereas
internal and external cooperation (￿RR and ￿RS) increase in r.
The intuition for the monotonicity result relies on the two motivations for being religious.
By the material motivation, the cost of religion should increase when the religion is larger as
then more intermediate types, who cooperate selectively and provide these relative bene￿ts, are
religious. On the other hand, by the spiritual motivation, the cost of religion should decrease
when more intermediate types are religious, as the marginal type is less averse to defection.
When the shocks are large enough, the spiritual motivation dominates, inducing a negative
monotone relationship between the cost of religion and its size.
Several empirical studies support this monotone relationship; Iannaccone (1992) ￿nds that
the stricter is the church in its demands, the higher is the level of contributions (in money and
time) within the church. Within religions, Iannaccone (1998) ￿nds that more conservative de-
nominations have members who contribute proportionally more income, attend more services,
and have more orthodox doctrinal beliefs. In an experimental study in Israeli Jewish Kib-
butzim, Sosis and Ru› e (2003) ￿nd that religious males are more cooperative compared with
seculars and with religious females (who participate in fewer rituals), and that cooperation
increases with synagogue attendance.
3.5 Secularization and economic development: comparative statics results
We conclude our main section with a comparative statics analysis of the implications of sci-
enti￿c progress and economic development on religious organizations. Weber (1904 and 1922)
advanced the secularization hypothesis claiming that as science progresses, the role that re-
ligion has to play in people￿ s life, re-assuring and explaining the world around them, will
diminish. Durkheim (1912) reached a similar conclusion, that the role of religion will diminish
over time, but for an institutional reason: economic and state development will crowd out the
13social institutions of the religion.15
As more and more scienti￿c knowledge becomes available it might make individuals less
prone to be a⁄ected by religious preaching. Thus, we can capture the e⁄ects of scienti￿c
progress by a shift in F; in a ￿rst order stochastic sense. In the limit, when no types with low
values of q (less than ￿ q) exist in society, a religious organization cannot arise.
Economic development implies that individuals can insure themselves against stochastic
welfare shocks. To analyze an increase in economic development we consider a decrease in the
value of ". In the limit, when shocks are negligible compared to the outcomes of the PD, a
religious organization will not arise.
While the above arguments suggest a simple relation between modernization and religious
participation, our model suggests a more complex one. To asses this, it is su¢ cient to analyze
the incentives of the marginal religious type.16 Consider such type in a religious organization
with selective cooperation. The marginal type, q0 is determined by,
(F(q0) ￿ F(q))(d ￿ a) + F(q)(d ￿ b) ￿ 2"q0F(q0) = r
Suppose we change the distribution of types in society from F to F0 where F0 ￿rst order
stochastically dominates F: The ￿rst expression represents a material gain from being religious
as a share of the religious, namely F(q0) ￿ F(q); cooperates only when their opponent is
religious. A shift to F0(q0) ￿ F0(q) can increase or decrease this term so to ￿x ideas suppose
that F0(q0) ￿ F0(q) = F(q0) ￿ F(q). The second expression represents a material loss; a
religious q0 cooperates against agents with q < q; whereas if he were to be secular, he could
take advantage of them by defecting. The magnitude of this loss depends on F(q) so a shift
to F0(q) < F(q) reduces this loss. Finally, the spiritual bene￿t depends on total religious
participation, F(q0); as this corresponds to the likelihood that the agent will cooperate. A
shift to F0(q0) < F(q0) decreases therefore the spiritual gain:
Thus, the spiritual and material motivations are at odds, which renders the e⁄ect of scienti￿c
progress on religious participation ambiguous. On the other hand, an increase in economic
development -a decrease in "- decreases religious participation unambiguously. More generally,
in some other equilibria, we establish a clear relationship between scienti￿c and economic
development on religious participation:
15The evidence on secularization is mixed. For a summary of the empirical evidence on secularization, see
Huber (2005).
16In the proof of Proposition 4 we show that for relatively high levels of shocks the bene￿t of being religious is
monotone and thus the change in bene￿t for the marginal type translates, one-to-one, to the e⁄ect on religious
participation in the new equilibrium.
14Proposition 5 For su¢ ciently high values of " :
(i) An increase in economic development decreases the size of the full cooperation religion,
selective cooperation religion and for some parameters, the religion with free riders.
(ii) An increase in scienti￿c knowledge decreases the size of the full cooperation religion but
has an ambiguous e⁄ect on other religions.
4 Religious groups and competition for members
In the ￿rst extension of our model, we consider the di⁄erent ways in which competition between
religious groups manifests itself. We ￿rst allow for several religious groups to emerge and
examine the patterns of cooperation between them. We then assume that group members can
partake in explicit hostile activities against non-a¢ liated ones; we show that such con￿ icts
may arise as a tool to increase the group membership.
4.1 Hierarchies of religions
Iannaccone (1994) ￿nds that "Relative to their more mainstream counterparts, members of
sectarian groups-both Christian and Jewish- hold fewer memberships in outside groups, con-
tribute less to outside causes, and have fewer outside friends." Farber (2001) shows how Or-
thodox Jews have been actively hostile towards the less demanding movements, conservative
and reform Judaism. These studies indicate that the stricter denominations might be less
cooperative towards other ones.
We now extend the model to allow for more than one religious group, in order to explore
such asymmetric relations between denominations. For simplicity, we assume that an agent￿ s
type qi determines his beliefs in any religious a¢ liation so that all religions face the same F
in society.17
We say that a religious group is "tolerant" ("intolerant") towards another religious group if
the (some) members of the group who cooperate internally, cooperate (defect) when matched
with members of the other group. The next result illustrates that whether groups are tolerant
towards one another depends on their internal level of cohesiveness,
Proposition 6 (i) Whenever there is non-tolerance between a full cooperation group and
another religious group, then the full cooperation group must be non-tolerant. (ii) For some
parameters, there exists an equilibrium with one tolerant selective cooperation group and one
17Our results do not rely on this assumption; given the assumption it is straightforward to extend the equi-
librium notion presented in Section 2 to several groups.
15intolerant full cooperation group, in which the full cooperation group has a higher intensity of
rituals.
Our result implies a hierarchy of churches or denominations - the stricter church, with the
higher intensity of rituals, is less cooperative towards other churches or religions who are less
strict in their demands.
4.2 Con￿ icts and hostility
So far we have interpreted group intolerance as the discriminating behaviour of these group
members towards non a¢ liated members. But intolerance, hostility, or con￿ icts in society
are often more centrally organized and involve extra curricular activities on top of such daily
interactions. We now show how hostile activities may arise in our model. To simplify, we
consider such hostile actions in the context of one organized religious group, as in our basic
model, and its relation vis a vis seculars.
The religious in our model already participate in some costly activities, namely rituals.
These are done in the social domain and can include praying or ceremonies. One way to think
about hostile activities is to embed them within the rituals; the costly observable actions that
both identify members with the religion and signal their beliefs may include participation in
demonstrations, or violent activities that hurt non-members.
We therefore add a parameter v so that r = r0+v; where v a⁄ects the utility of a secular indi-
vidual in a negative way, in￿ icting a cost c(v;￿) > 0 increasing in both elements. This implies
that the relative cost of joining the religion is now r ￿c(v;￿): As the e⁄ective cost of religious
participation decreases, by the monotonicity result of Proposition 4, religious participation will
in turn increase:
Corollary 1: For su¢ ciently high values of "; an increase in v increases the size of the
religion.
The implication of the corollary is that groups that can impose costly actions on others, have
an incentive to do so. If religious leaders put weight on participation and if the technology
of violence, c(v;￿); is relatively e¢ cient, they have an incentive to instruct members to in￿ ict
some cost on non-members. In that sense, competition for members between religious and
secular groups or more generally between several religious groups can lead simultaneously to
a higher religious participation and more violence in society.
165 The dynamics of religion
Personal experiences are important in shaping individuals￿attitudes and beliefs towards re-
ligion, and are often mentioned as motivations for conversions or deconversions.18 We now
analyze how realized shocks to the well being of individuals a⁄ect their beliefs and what it
implies for the dynamics of religious organizations. We ￿rst consider how correlated shocks to
the whole population a⁄ect religious participation in the short term, and then discuss the long
term survival of religious organizations.
To allow for belief dynamics, assume that each individual does not know the exact values
of qi
c and qi
d but rather his type is such that qi
c and qi
d are taken (independently) from full-
support density functions fi(qi
c) and fi(qi
d), respectively. The de￿nition of qi is now altered
to qi = Ei(qi
c) ￿ Ei(qi
d): We ￿x the initial types in the population -fi(qi
c) and fi(qi
d))- and let
each individual update his type following his course of play, and the shock he receives.19
The following Lemma will be useful for our analysis; it establishes that in response to a shock,
individuals update their beliefs conditional on the action they have played in the game:20
Lemma 1 (i) Following a negative shock, an agent who cooperated (defected) will decrease
(increase) his qi. (ii) Following a positive shock, an agent who cooperated (defected) will
decrease (increase) his qi:
Intuitively, an individual who has been cooperating and experienced a positive shock, believes
that on average qi
c is lower but does not change his beliefs on qi
d; whereas an individual who
has been defecting and experienced a positive shock, believes that on average qi
d is lower and
does not change his beliefs on qi
c: Similar intuition holds for negative shocks. An implication of
Lemma 1 is that individuals will update their beliefs depending on the particular equilibrium
they play, as this determines the actions they take in the PD game.
5.1 Religion in "good" and "bad" times
Following natural and other disasters, individuals and religious leaders often re-evaluate, or
feel a need to justify, their religious stances (e.g., Jewish theology after the holocaust). Recent
empirical work (Chen (2008)) suggests that following the ￿nancial crisis in Indonesia, religious
18For example, the 1966 Nobel laureate in Literature, S.Y. Agnon, became religious after in 1924 he lost ￿ve
years worth of writings in a ￿re.
19We assume that individuals do not learn from the observation of others￿actions and shocks; this could be
motivated by imperfect observability of others￿actions or experiences.
20This is a similar e⁄ect to the one in Piketty (1995).
17participation had increased. We now discuss how correlated shocks to the whole of society a⁄ect
religious participation.21 We illustrate such dynamics by focusing on the selective cooperation
equilibrium.
Suppose ￿rst that all individuals in society experience a positive shock (e.g., an economic
boom). By Lemma 1, all individuals with relatively low qi; who have been cooperating, will
decrease their qi even further, and all those with relatively high qi; who have been defecting,
will increase their qi even further. However, some religious individuals with intermediate qi;
who have been defecting, will increase their qi; possibly enough to switch a¢ liation to seculars.
Thus, a correlated positive shock will tend to both polarize beliefs in society and decrease the
size of the religion.
On the other hand, a negative shock (e.g., a natural disaster) will have the opposite e⁄ect
in terms of beliefs. Agents with relatively high qi who have been defecting will reduce their qi
(and might become religious) while agents with low qi who have been cooperating will increase
their qi (and might become seculars). The e⁄ect of a correlated negative shock on religious
participation is therefore ambiguous. Everything else equal, the size of the religion will increase
following a negative shock, if the religion is small enough to start with. To see why, note that
the smaller is the religion, the less likely it is that intermediate religious types cooperate and
are thus less likely to leave the faith. On the other hand, seculars defect against whoever they
meet so that the in￿ ow rate to the religion is not a⁄ected by its original size.
5.2 Maintaining religious beliefs
Church (as well as religious ceremonies) attendance in Britain have been steadily falling from
around 40% in 1850 to 10% in 1990￿ s, whereas in the U.S. it remained ￿ at during these times.
Similarly, while some religious groups show strong persistence through time, some systems of
beliefs and practices have vanished. Which religious organizations will survive in the long run
- if at all?
In Section 4.1. we illustrated how religious organizations a⁄ect the distribution of beliefs
in society whereas our basic model had determined how the distribution of beliefs a⁄ects the
form of religious organizations. We can now use this reciprocal relationship between beliefs
and religious organizations to analyze whether religions can be sustained in the long term.
To make the survival of religion more di¢ cult, assume that there is no relation between
21Recall that the beliefs we consider are only about the relation between individuals￿actions and their personal
shocks. Thus, individuals cannot interpret a common shock as the result of a communal sin. This assumption
does not a⁄ect the qualitative nature of our results but does a⁄ect their magnitude.
18social actions and shocks (so that the truth is "secular"). Nonetheless, beliefs that induce
individuals to cooperate against all opponents will allow them to maintain erroneous beliefs
about the relative bene￿t of defecting; such types may stick to their beliefs forever as they do
not learn anything about defection.22 Thus, the full cooperation equilibrium can be sustained
in the long run in some environments, even when the truth is "secular".23
On the other hand, in the selective cooperation (or free riding) equilibria, intermediate
types experiment, i.e., they sometimes cooperate and sometimes defect. As they learn about
all possible actions, in the long run, they (or their o⁄springs) will converge to hold beliefs
which are close to the truth. Thus, no intermediate types can exist in the long run. In other
words, religions with selective cooperation, or with free riders, cannot survive.
We can conclude that such organizations -that include some selective cooperation- can po-
tentially survive only if beliefs are immune to available information. However, several religious
practices can allow religions (or religious leaders) to do exactly that: either censor information
or create systems of beliefs that are immune to it. Our model can therefore shed light on such
practices:
The "Afterlife"
Focusing beliefs on rewards and punishment in the afterlife implies that such beliefs are
not veri￿able in this life. Indeed, the Judeo-Christian traditions, bring the afterlife, with its
concepts of heaven and hell, to the fore. Similarly, the Eastern religions such as Hinduism,
Buddhism and Sikhism, share beliefs of reincarnation, in which the future "self" will pay for
the sins or gain from the good deeds of the current one. Some religious writings however are
based only on this life.24
Forgiveness
Forgiveness, with its twin concepts of atonement and repent, are important concepts in
the Judeo-Christian tradition. While there are di⁄erent explanations to the usefulness of
forgiveness and its function in religious organizations, our model suggests another way to
view this religious practice. In some sense, forgiveness blurs the relation between actions and
rewards. While an omnipresent God will surely know that one has sinned, it is not known
22Their beliefs about cooperation (q
i
c) will converge to the truth and will be "self-con￿rming", as in Fudenberg
and Levine (1993).
23The equilibrium in which all individuals in society are religious may exist in the long run as well. In both
this and the full cooperation equilibria individuals always cooperate or always defect disregarding their opponent
a¢ liation.
24Such as the Nuer (in Evans-Pritchard 1956) or ancient Germanic religions.
19whether God has forgiven or not, and hence whether punishment will be in￿ icted upon the
individual.
Complicated systems of beliefs
Our analysis is simpli￿ed by the assumption that the shocks depend only on individual
actions; it is often believed that the whole collective is punished for the sins of some, or escapes
punishment due to the good deeds of others. Such more complicated systems of religious beliefs
make it harder for individuals to update their beliefs correctly. First, the behaviour of others
is often not observed and hence cannot be conditioned upon. Second, even if the behaviour
of one￿ s opponent is observed, equilibrium observations of play will not constitute su¢ cient
information as typically they will not include all possible con￿gurations of actions. Thus, full
learning will not arise in the long run.
Segregation
Many religious organizations tend to segregate their members from non-members either
physically or in other ways that limit access to information about the experiences of non-
members.25 The bene￿t of such segregation can be two-fold. First, religious agents will mostly
meet other religious agents and will avoid being taken advantage of. A second bene￿t is
that such isolation might allow the religious to avoid information that is unfavorable for the
prevalence of their beliefs.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a simple model of religious organizations which relies on the ability of such
organizations to a⁄ect beliefs of individuals about the relation between their social actions and
shocks to their utility. The model ties together the three most observed aspects of religious
organizations: beliefs, social behaviour, and rituals.
We have analyzed the stability of religious organizations and their features, but abstracted
away from how they arise; the role of religious leaders as selecting these organizations is an
important extension which we leave for future research. Another related topic is "religious
governance", i.e., the study of the structure of religious organizations. While some religions
are centralized (e.g., the Roman Catholic church), others (such as Islam) are decentralized.
Such di⁄erences may depend on features -some related to our model- such as the importance
25An extension of our model in which individuals who belong to the same a¢ liation can be matched to play
the PD game with members from this a¢ liation only yields qualitatively similar results.
20of network e⁄ects, the level of competition for members, or the importance of church-state
links.
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23Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2: Recall that secular individuals always defect, religious
individuals below q always cooperate, religious individuals above ￿ q always defect, and interme-
diates defect against seculars. It is therefore left to consider how intermediates behave against
fellow religious members. A religious individual will defect against another religious agent,
who cooperates with probability ￿RR; if:
￿RRb + (1 ￿ ￿RR)a + "(1 ￿ 2qi
d) ￿ ￿RRd + (1 ￿ ￿RR)c + "(1 ￿ 2qi
c)




((d ￿ b)￿RR + (c ￿ a)(1 ￿ ￿RR)) = ￿RR￿ q + (1 ￿ ￿RR)q (2)
where qRR and ￿RR are endogenously determined in equilibrium.
We ￿rst consider the relative bene￿t of a religious agent from being religious vs. being
secular:
Lemma A1 For a religious agent, the relative bene￿t of being religious is monotonically
decreasing and continuous in qi:
Proof: For a type below q; the relative bene￿t of being religious is given by:
￿(￿RRd + (1 ￿ ￿RR)c) + (1 ￿ ￿)c + "(1 ￿ 2qi
c)
￿￿(￿RSb + (1 ￿ ￿RS)a) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a ￿ "(1 ￿ 2qi
d)
= Mqi￿q(￿;￿RR;￿RS) ￿ 2"qi;
where Mqi￿q(￿;￿RR;￿RS) is ￿xed for all qi ￿ q and represents "material" payo⁄s from the
PD game, while the second term above, ￿2"qi; represents the "spiritual" payo⁄.
For types above q and below qRR; the relative bene￿t for being religious is given by:
￿(￿RRd + (1 ￿ ￿RR)c) + (1 ￿ ￿)a + "￿(1 ￿ 2qi
c) + "(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 2qi
d)
￿￿(￿RSb + (1 ￿ ￿RS)a) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a ￿ "(1 ￿ 2qi
d)
= Mq￿qi￿qRR(￿;￿RR;￿RS) ￿ 2"￿qi:
Where again the material bene￿t is ￿xed for these types and does not change with qi: It is
di⁄erent though from the material bene￿t for the lower types as these types defect more often.
Finally for types above qRR:
￿(￿RRb + (1 ￿ ￿RR)a) + (1 ￿ ￿)a + "(1 ￿ 2qi
d)
￿￿(￿RSb + (1 ￿ ￿RS)a) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a ￿ "(1 ￿ 2qi
d)
= Mqi>qRR(￿;￿RR;￿RS) = ￿(￿RR ￿ ￿RS)(b ￿ a) ￿ 0:
24Moreover, one can show that Mqi￿q(￿;￿RR;￿RS) ￿ 2"q = Mq￿qi￿qRR(￿;￿RR;￿RS) ￿ 2"￿q and
that Mq￿qi￿qRR(￿;￿RR;￿RS) ￿ 2"￿qRR = Mqi>qRR; hence the bene￿t is continuous in qi:￿
Given the monotonicity property in Lemma A1, and given some r;￿;￿RS and ￿RR; it is
optimal for all religious agents below some q0 to be religious.
The expressions for the material payo⁄s above represent the relative bene￿t of being religious
as viewed by the seculars, as these agents consider only the material payo⁄ when evaluating
a¢ liation choices:
Lemma A2 (i) For seculars, the relative bene￿t from being religious is (weakly) monoton-
ically increasing in their type qi: (ii) The relative bene￿t from being religious is equal for a
secular type and for a religious type above qRR.
If q0 is high enough such that a religious agents above qRR strictly prefers to be religious, then,
together with condition (iii) of the equilibrium de￿nition, all society is religious in equilibrium.
If on the other hand q0 is low enough so that such a religious type prefers to be secular, then
by Lemma A2, such a secular type also prefers to stay secular, and also all other secular types
prefer to stay secular. Thus, all secular agents with q ￿ q0 will, at least weakly, prefer to
be secular. This insures that no secular individual will prefer to be religious and no religious
individual will prefer to be secular. Together with condition (iii), we can then look for equilibria
in which all agents with types below q0 are religious. Thus there could only be four types of
equilibria, depending on the level at which r intersects the religious bene￿t function outlined
in Lemma A1 above:
Full cooperation religion
In the ￿rst family of equilibria, 1 = ￿RR = ￿RS > 0, and members are only below q. Also,
qRR = ￿ q: Let r1 = 2"F(q)(￿ q ￿ q) and r2 = 2"(q + 1): Note that minfr1;r2g > 0: We now show
that these equilibria hold for any r 2 [minfr1;r2g;maxfr1;r2g].
What we need to determine is the marginal type, who is indi⁄erent between being religious
and being secular, given his beliefs q0: We therefore need to solve:
Mqi￿q(￿;￿RR;￿RS) ￿ 2"q0 = r ,
F(q0)(d ￿ b) + (1 ￿ F(q0))(c ￿ a) ￿ 2"q0 = r ,
F(q0)￿ q + (1 ￿ F(q0))q ￿ q0 =
r
2"
To see why a solution exists to the above ￿xed point equation in q0, consider some r in the
range described above. If q0 = ￿1; then, as F(q0) = 0; we have that the left-hand-side of the
equation is q + 1 which is greater (smaller) than the right-hand-side when r1 < r2 (r1 > r2).
25If on the other hand, q0 = q; then the left-hand-side becomes F(q)(￿ q ￿ q); and it is smaller
(greater) than the right-hand-side when r1 < r2 (r1 > r2): By continuity, a ￿xed point exists.
Selective cooperation equilibrium
In the second type of equilibrium, 1 = ￿RR > ￿RS > 0. Let r1 = (F(￿ q) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a) and
r2 = 2"F(q)(￿ q￿q): Note that minfr1;r2g > 0: We now show that these equilibria hold for any
r 2 [minfr1;r2g;maxfr1;r2g].
Again, as ￿RR = 1; we have that qRR = ￿ q. We need to determine which of the types below
qRR is the marginal type, i.e., to solve:
Mq￿qi￿qRR(￿;￿RR;￿RS) ￿ 2"￿q0 = r ,
F(q0)(d ￿ a) ￿ F(q)(b ￿ a) ￿ 2"F(q0)q0 = r
The existence of a ￿xed point, for the relevant range of r, follows from the same argument
as described in the previous section with q and ￿ q as the end points.
Free riders equilibrium
In this family of equilibria, all below qRR and a measure ￿ of types above it are religious,
so that 1 > ￿RR > ￿RS > 0: In response to the introduction of religious types who defect,
there are fewer types below qRR so that qRR < ￿ q. Such an equilibrium exists for any r 2
[r￿;(F(￿ q) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a)]; for some r￿ that will be de￿ned below.
The equilibrium is a solution to the ￿xed point equation in (2), where ￿RR =
F(qRR)
F(qRR)+￿:
Moreover, as the relative bene￿t to religious types who defect from being religious does not de-
pend on qi; they must be indi⁄erent so that some of them, but not all, are religious. Thus, given
the solution to qRR, we have to ￿nd ￿RR so that these types are indi⁄erent. For consistency,








r = (F(q0) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a)
When ￿ = 0; q0 is set at ￿ q; and is the limit of the selective cooperation equilibria, when
there are no "free riders". When ￿ is higher, and the religion has a larger share of free riders,
q0 decreases. To determine the lower bound r
ﬂ
we can ￿nd the limit of these equilibria when
the whole population is religious (so that ￿ = 1). Speci￿cally, let ￿ = 1￿F(q0): We then have
r￿ = (F(q￿) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a) where q￿ is the solution to q0 = F(q0)￿ q + (1 ￿ F(q0))q: Note that
r￿ > 0 as for any full-support distribution function F; q￿ > q:
Society with no seculars
26Finally, for any r ￿ r￿; there exists an equilibrium in which the whole society is religious.
This equilibrium is as the limit equilibrium described above, which holds for r￿: In this equi-
librium, all agents below q￿ cooperate, and all agents above q￿ defect. If an agent deviates
and becomes secular, then a share F(q￿) ￿ F(q) of the population will defect against him.
Obviously, this equilibrium can be sustained for any r ￿ r￿; including negative values of r.￿
Proof of Proposition 4: We ￿rst show that for high enough "; the religions speci￿ed in
Proposition 2 are segregated in r as stated in (ii). In particular, this holds if:
(F(￿ q) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a) < 2"F(q)(￿ q ￿ q) < 2"(q + 1): (3)
We now show why (3) holds when " is high enough. Consider ￿rst the left-hand-side in-
equality:
(F(￿ q) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a) < 2"F(q)(￿ q ￿ q) ,






By strategic complements, d￿c
b￿a > 1: On the other hand, the left-hand-side approaches 1 when
" increases. Consider now the right-hand-side inequality:
2"F(q)(￿ q ￿ q) < 2"(q + 1) ,
F(q)(￿ q ￿ q) < q + 1
When " increases the left-hand-side approaches zero whereas the right-hand-side is positive
and bounded away from zero.
We now conduct the local analysis which also shows uniqueness. In the full cooperation
religion, the equilibrium condition is,
F(q0)￿ q + (1 ￿ F(q0))q ￿ q0 =
r
2"
First note that for high enough shocks, as (￿ q ￿ q) becomes arbitrarily small, the left hand
side is decreasing in q0;
@(F(q0)￿ q + (1 ￿ F(q0))q ￿ q0)
@q0 = ((f(q0)(￿ q ￿ q) ￿ 1)):





2"((f(q0)(￿ q ￿ q) ￿ 1))




Note that in this equilibrium ￿ = F(q0) and so is decreasing in r: As for this equilibrium
￿RS = ￿RR = 1; these are weakly increasing in r:
In the second type of equilibrium, we have a religion where some of its members cooperate
selectively. The equilibrium condition is,
F(q0)(d ￿ a) ￿ F(q)(b ￿ a) ￿ 2"F(q0)q0 = r
First note that for high enough shocks, the left hand side is decreasing in q0: The derivative
of the left hand side is given by,
@(F(q0)(d ￿ a) ￿ F(q)(b ￿ a) ￿ 2"F(q0)q0)
@q0 = (f(q0)((d ￿ a) ￿ 2"q0) ￿ 2"F(q0))
where (d ￿ a) ￿ 2"q0 is bounded by d ￿ c and so negative for high levels of ": this implies that
there is a unique equilibrium.





(f(q0)((d ￿ a) ￿ 2"q0) ￿ 2"F(q0))
Again as shocks become large this is negative. In this equilibrium ￿ = F(q0) and so is
decreasing in r: In this equilibrium 1 = ￿RR > ￿RS =
F(q)
F(q0); these are weakly increasing in r:








r = (F(q0) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a):
Given r, as F(:) is increasing, there is a unique value of q0 satisfying the second equation.
Given this value of q0; the value of ￿ satisfying the ￿rst equation is unique as the right hand
side is decreasing in ￿: therefore the equilibrium is unique. In this equilibrium ￿ = F(q0) + ￿:






and for the ￿rst equation,
d￿
dq
(q ￿ q) = f(q)(￿ q ￿ q) ￿ F(q0) ￿ ￿













f(q)(￿ q ￿ q) ￿ F(q0) ￿ ￿
(q ￿ q)








where by the above ￿RS is increasing in r: To see that ￿RR is also increasing in r; note that by
the above q0 is increasing in r: ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: First note that the material bene￿ts of types below q are the
lowest among all types of individuals and we therefore focus on ￿nding equilibria in which they
are better o⁄ than in a secular world in which all defect and hence utility is a. We now ￿nd
the equilibrium which o⁄ers the best case scenario for these types.
From the proof of proposition 4, the bene￿t of these types is increasing in q0, the cuto⁄ in a
full cooperation equilibrium. Consider next the selective cooperation equilibrium. The bene￿t
of type below q is
F(q0)d + (1 ￿ F(q0))c ￿ r ￿ a
= (1 ￿ F(q0))(c ￿ a) + F(q)(b ￿ a) + 2"F(q0)q0
taking derivative with respect to q0 we get,
￿f(q0))(c ￿ a ￿ 2"q0) + 2"F(q0) > 0
as q0 > c￿a
2" .
Consider now equilibria with free riders. The bene￿t of type below q is,
F(q0)d + (1 ￿ F(q0))c ￿ r ￿ a
= F(q0)(d ￿ c ￿ b + a) + F(q)(b ￿ a) + c ￿ a
This is also increasing in q0 and so is maximized at q0 = ￿ q which is the limit of the selective
equilibria.
Therefore we consider the selective cooperation equilibrium with the largest religion which
satis￿es
(F(￿ q) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a) = r
29For religious below q, the bene￿t of being in this equilibrium rather than in a secular world is
F(￿ q)d + (1 ￿ F(￿ q))c ￿ r ￿ a
= F(￿ q)(d ￿ b) + (1 ￿ F(￿ q))(c ￿ a) + F(q)(b ￿ a)
Note that this expression is increasing in " as ￿ q are q increasing in " and by the strategic
complementarities. We can ￿nd a ￿ > 0 and a distribution satisfying F(￿ q)(d￿b)+F(q)(b￿a) >
￿ and (1 ￿ F(￿ q)) <
￿
jc￿aj for which this utility di⁄erence is strictly larger than zero.￿
Proof of Proposition 5: In the full cooperation religion equilibrium conditions are given
by,
F(q0)(d ￿ b) + (1 ￿ F(q0))(c ￿ a) ￿ 2"q0 = r:
In the proof of Proposition 4 we have shown that for high enough shocks the left hand side is
decreasing in q0 implying a unique equilibrium. Note that both increased scienti￿c knowledge
and increased economic development imply that the left hand side decreases and hence the
resulting new equilibrium will have a higher cuto⁄ q0:
In a religious organization with selective cooperation the equilibrium condition is,
F(q0)((d ￿ a) ￿ 2"q0) ￿ F(q)(b ￿ a) = r
Again in Proposition 4 we have proved that for high enough " the left hand side is decreasing
in q0: Increased economic development (lower ") clearly lowers the left hand side resulting in
a new equilibrium with lower participation. We have illustrated in the text why scienti￿c
progress has ambiguous e⁄ects on religious participation.








r = (F(q0) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a)












d" ((￿ q ￿ q)
f(q0)￿
(F(q0)+￿) ￿ 1) ￿ 1
2"(F(q0)￿ q + (1 ￿ F(q0))q)
(￿ q ￿ q)
F(q0)
(F(q0)+￿)2
30The size of religious participation is F(q0) + ￿; so the sign e⁄ect of economic development















(￿ q ￿ q)f(q0) ￿ 1






(F(q0)￿ q + (1 ￿ F(q0))q)




Note that for high " the ￿rst term is insigni￿cant and hence the sign depends on the the
relative size of the second and third expressions (which are of con￿ icting signs). Which of them




(F(q0)￿ q+(1￿F(q0))q) 7 1; where:
f(q)
f(q0)
q(1 ￿ (￿ q ￿ q)f(q0))




and thus it will depend on whether
f(q)
f(q0) 7 1:￿
Proof of Proposition 6: (i) Consider a fully cooperative group, A, and a selective
cooperation group, B. If group A is tolerant, all its intermediate types cooperate with group B
members, then it must be that all intermediate types of group B will cooperate with members
of group A, since it is their best response. Thus, to sustain intolerance between group A and
B, it must be that the group A is intolerant.
(ii) We now construct an equilibrium with two religions with the following characteristics:
1 = ￿R2R2 > ￿R1R2 > ￿R1R1 = ￿R2R1 > ￿R1S > 0:
In particular, in this equilibrium, all R1 agents which cooperate in R1 also cooperate with
agents in R2, whereas the opposite is not true, as agents in R2 enjoy full internal cooperation
but some of them defect against members of R1.
Let qIJ; where I 2 fR1;R2g and J 2 fR1;R2;Sg be the cuto⁄ above which individuals
who are in I will defect against people in J: In equilibrium we have ￿ q = qR2R2 > qR1R2 >
qR1R1 = qR2R1 > q: Religious individuals with qi ￿ q and will cooperate with all. Religious
individuals with qi 2 (q;qR1R1); will defect against seculars and cooperate otherwise. Religious
individuals, in (qR1R1;qR1R2); will, when in R1 or R2; cooperate only with R2 members, and
defect otherwise. Religious individuals in (qR1R2; ￿ q]; when in R2 will cooperate only with R2
members, and will defect otherwise. Finally, religious individuals with qi > ￿ q; will defect
against all. Note that for all these types, the bene￿t from joining R2 is always greater than the
bene￿t from joining R1; as they will enjoy a higher level of cooperation from society overall.
We set r1 = (F(qR1R1) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a) and r2 = (F(qR1R1) ￿ F(q))(b ￿ a) + (F(qR1R2) ￿
F(qR1R1))(d ￿ c) > r1: This implies that religious agents with qi < qR1R2 strictly prefer to
31be religious than to be secular, but are indi⁄erent with regard to which religion to join. On
the other hand, types with qi > qR1R2 are indi⁄erent between joining R1 and being secular,
and strictly prefer it to joining R2. We can therefore consider an equilibrium in which R1
includes a mass ￿ of the types with qi ￿ q, all types in (q;qR1R1), and a mass ￿ of types with
qi > qR1R2, and in which R2 includes the remaining share of the types with qi ￿ q and all
types in (qR1R1;qR1R2). The remaining agents are secular. The equations for the cuto⁄ points
are:
qR1R1 = ￿R1R1￿ q + (1 ￿ ￿R1R1)q;
qR1R2 = ￿R1R2￿ q + (1 ￿ ￿R1R2)q
this implies,
qR1R1 =
F(qR1R1) ￿ F(q) + ￿
F(qR1R1) ￿ F(q) + ￿ + ￿
(￿ q ￿ q) + q
qR1R2 =
F(q) ￿ ￿
F(qR1R2) ￿ F(qR1R1) + F(q) ￿ ￿
(￿ q ￿ q) + q
Note that to solve for an equilibrium, we simply need to ￿nd ￿ and ￿ such that the solution
for the above ￿xed points equations (note that we ￿rst solve for qR1R1 and then for qR1R2);
will satisfy the following conditions:
1 > ￿R1R2 > ￿R1R1 > ￿R1S > 0
0 < ￿ < F(q); 0 < ￿ < 1 ￿ F(qR1R2)
Consider the uniform distribution on [￿1;1], i.e., F(q) = 1
2(1 + q). Let ￿ q = ￿0:25 and let
q = ￿0:5: Finally, let ￿ = 0:2 and let ￿ = 0:3: The solution is is qR1R1 = ￿0:38446;qR2R1 =
￿0:33393 and it satis￿es all the conditions set above.￿
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that an individual cooperated in the game (the analysis for
an individual who defected is analogous). Note that such an individual will only update his































The MLRP therefore holds, implying the result reported in Lemma 1.￿
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